POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE OLYMPICS: HOW THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE SOUGHT TO USE TELEVISION MONEY DURING THE COLD WAR

A.Moretti

(USA, Point Park University, Pittsburgh)

INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union and the United States engaged in an often strained political relationship, following World War II and continuing through 1991 when the USSR dissolved. The uneasy association also affected the arena of sports, and it was especially evident during the quadrennial Olympic Games. The Soviet and American governments welcomed the victories that their athletes achieved at the Olympics, especially when they came at the expense of the other side. The differences between the two nations (and their political allies) also could be seen in the debate surrounding the development of the Olympic Movement, which was an effort by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to spread what it believed were the values of the Olympics to the world.
The role that television played in advancing the IOC’s agenda cannot be underestimated. (The inherent differences between what the networks hoped to achieve through their association with the Olympics and what the IOC hoped to achieve through its association with the networks cannot be ignored, but they are not addressed in depth in this research.)
First, this paper traces the increasingly powerful role that television money and exposure played throughout the Cold War in advancing the IOC’s agenda. That, perhaps overly-simplified, agenda was to see that more and more people around the world were introduced to and embraced the Olympic ideals of sportsmanship, fair play and the celebration of sport. But what about the Cold War adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union; how did they see the consistent increase in television money as useful for the advancement of their agendas?
This paper also argues that the Soviet Union, because of its political and economic system, was never positioned to be a major player in adding television money to the IOC’s coffers. However, it was deeply interested in re-shaping the IOC into an organization that was less-oriented toward the West. Moreover, beginning before World War II it had used sports as a means of fostering positive relations with other nations. Thus, this paper attempts to show that Soviet Olympic officials believed they could increase their power within the IOC and standing around the world by advocating that the IOC use its increasing financial strength to adopt policies that were less aligned with the capitalist world.
Meanwhile, United States Olympic officials seemed content to remain aloof from the television debate up to the point when they saw that they could make money from the ever-expanding pool of television money that the IOC was dipping into. By coincidence, the increase in television rights fees came at a time when America’s fortunes at the Olympics were in decline.
Beginning in 1956, the second Games in which athletes from the USSR competed, Soviet Olympians won more gold medals than their American counterparts except in 1964 and 1968. They also won more total medals every year except in 1968. (The 1980 and 1984 Games, which the Americans and Soviets respectively boycotted, were not considered relevant for comparison.)
Thus, U.S. Olympic officials were aware that more and more Americans were tuning into the Olympics and watching Soviet athletes win more and more medals. They saw an opportunity to argue for a greater share of the American television rights fees in hopes of using those dollars to better train and prepare American athletes for subsequent Olympic Games. In short, they, too, had a political agenda when it came to the discussion about television money.
Because this research covers the Cold War period, which for purposes of this study was defined as 1948 (the first post-war Olympics) through 1988 (the final Games in which the Soviet Union participated), the most recent and sometimes controversial issues surrounding the relationship between the IOC and television are not discussed here. The author agrees that a more complete analysis of how television money has influenced the IOC and the Olympic Games should include the post-Cold War period. However, this paper is directed less at an understanding of how television money has affected the growth and presentation of the Olympic Games and more toward recognizing how the United States and the Soviet Union – during their protracted poor diplomatic relationship – thought television money could and should be used by the IOC. Thus, the 1948 through 1988 period is applicable to this research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The IOC has held firm to the belief – before, during, and after the Cold War – that international politics has no place in the Olympic Games. However, its attempts at separating politics and sports often have proven unsuccessful. Espy (Espy, 1979) argued that the structure of the Games, which was, and continues to be, built around the nation-state, contributed to this failure. He added that the IOC’s mandate that athletes compete not as individuals but instead as members of a country also has led to frustrations for the IOC.
Television also has been identified as a cause for the rampant nationalism associated with the Olympics. Those who support television’s interaction with the Olympic Movement, including the IOC, are quick to note that the IOC has generated its financial windfall from television. Moreover, the medium has assisted in showcasing the grace, strength and determination of Olympians worldwide (IOC, 1994). However, critics, such as Barnett (Barnett, 1990), point out that the networks are exercising too much control over the Games due to the financial stake they have in them. Part of this influence can be seen in the scheduling of events. One need only to flash back to the 1988 Summer Games in Seoul, where the finals of selected events were moved to the morning in order that they could be shown live during the lucrative “prime time” slots in the United States, for an example of the media’s influence. A Seoul Olympic official justified the scheduling by arguing that many Olympic sports had enjoyed continuous growth in popularity around the world, and television had played an integral role in that growth. Therefore, in his opinion, certain events in the Games’ schedule had to be designed so as to maximize their economic potential (Larson and Park, 1993).
More disturbing to critics is the recognition that networks manipulate the Games’ coverage. Instead of working in concert with the IOC to promote the values of fair play, friendly competition, and the celebration of sport, television producers regularly create a program in which the Olympics are seen as a battle of good versus evil. For American television executives, the “good guys” are the men and women who make up the U.S team; the “bad guys” are whoever is identified as the enemy. During the Cold War, that enemy was the Soviet Union. This blatant appeal to patriotism makes critics, such as Nixon, uncomfortable. He has claimed that the invocation of the red, white, and blue is not genuine, but rather an effort aimed at ensuring that the networks’ financial investment in the Olympics ends up in the black (Nixon, in Seagrave and Chu, 1988).
The most important goal of America’s foreign policy during the Cold War was the containment of communism. Herman and Chomsky have suggested that too often media coverage of this effort – ironically – became equated to a sports contest “with gains and losses allocated to contesting sides.” The authors claimed that the media further contributed to this sports metaphor by “rooting for our side,” which, they asserted, during the Cold War became “an entirely legitimate news practice” (1988, 30-31). These comments have been supported by various research.
Kriesberg’s (Kriesberg, 1947) content analysis of New York Times’ coverage of the Soviet Union from 1917 through 1946 offered one example. He found that news unfavorable to the USSR received far more attention in the newspaper than did news that was favorable. Kriesberg added that Soviet leaders often were characterized negatively, and that most positive portrayals of them were linked to the fact that they were working with America’s leaders.
Moretti (Moretti, 2002) reviewed New York Times’ coverage of the entrance of the Soviet Union into the Olympic Games. The study, which examined the years 1948 through 1952, found that stories written by the newspaper’s reporters demonstrated a consistently negative tone toward the Soviet Union, its reasons for wanting to enter the Olympic Games, and its willingness to abide by IOC rules.
Schillinger and Jenswold reported a “national bias” existed in U.S. newspaper coverage of the Olympics. They found that the Washington Post, when compared to Pravda, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, was more “nationalistic” and “more partisan” in its coverage of the 1976, 1980, and 1984 Summer Olympic Games (1987, 826-833).
That “partisan” attitude also existed during the 1992 Winter Games, which took place about five weeks after the collapse of the USSR. Riggs, Eastman and Golobic examined the comments made by announcers for CBS and TNT during the Games from Albertville, France. They reported that the Unified Team, the nations which comprised the Commonwealth of Independent States, was “portrayed nationalistically only 53 percent of the time, but almost uniformly hostilely.” They added that the commentary repeatedly suggested that the Unified Team was representing a “weak” country, a “quashed national enemy” (1993, 261-264).
METHOD
The justification for examining the debate about the use of television money comes from the acknowledgment that advances in international communications have not only made the Olympic easier to cover but also an avenue through which television companies could use sports to attract large audiences and lucrative advertising incomes. Moreover, the justification for examining how American and Soviet Olympic officials reacted to the increase in television money recognized that both nations believed the Games were more than just sports events; each wanted to use the athletic competitions for domestic and international propaganda value. In addition, as the USSR became the nation that repeatedly won the most number of Olympic medals, it also was seeking to re-shape the Western-dominated IOC into an organization that would be more sympathetic to Soviet aims.
Various primary (and secondary) sources were used in the researching of this historical-based paper. The author made extensive use of the Avery Brundage papers, which are housed at the University of Illinois. Brundage was the president of the IOC from 1952 through 1972 and was hesitant to deeply involve the IOC with the television industry. He also had deep reservations about the Soviet Union’s commitment to uphold many IOC rules; nevertheless, he supported the Soviet’s decision to join the Olympic family of nations.
Documents, especially relating to the development of television rights and the issues relating to the medium’s involvement with the IOC, available at the Amateur Athletic Foundation of Los Angeles library also were used in this research.
The other primary sources were the stories and editorials that appeared in either the New York Times or the Los Angeles Times. The former was chosen because it is recognized as one of America’s elite newspapers. Merrill (Merrill, 1968: 13) has suggested that an elite newspaper should be “serious, concerned, intelligent and articulate,” and he applied that elite status to the New York Times.
The Los Angeles Times was chosen because it was the principal newspaper in the only United States city to host the Summer Games between 1948 and 1988 (Squaw Valley, California and Lake Placid, New York did host the Winter Games during this period). Los Angeles served as host in 1984; however, it had bid on the Summer Games multiple times before that, including in 1980, the Games that were awarded to Moscow. Thus, the newspaper should have devoted substantial coverage to issues relating to the Olympic Movement because of that city’s effort to once again host the Summer Olympics, which it had done in 1932.
The news items that were included in this research do not reflect everything that the two newspapers had to say about the interaction between television and the Olympics; rather, the accounts and editorials identified here are designed to contribute to this study’s narrative.
It was necessary to look at every calendar year between 1948 and 1988 because while the Olympics were held once every four years, the debate about the relationship between the IOC and the television industry did not stop once a particular Olympic Games ended. Furthermore, a complete review of these years made it possible to fully trace how the newspapers reported this issue over time.
MEDIA AND THE OLYMPICS: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Beginning with the Seoul negotiations, the IOC finally achieved what it had sought for more than a decade: A powerful role in the talks surrounding television contracts. No longer would it stand by and let an OCOG take money out of its pocket. It also had been during the late 1970s and into the 1980s that the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) had taken the same position: No longer was it going to stand by and let the IOC and the OCOGs dip deeply into the rich U.S. financial pie. In the words of Barney and his colleagues, “It would not be until the era of sensational escalation of television rights fees in the 1970s and 1980s that USOC officials were aroused to seek their own independent share of the American revenue pot.” These authors noted that in prior years the USOC had been “mute” when it came to discussions about and involvement in the divvying up of money from television and commercial sponsorships (Barney, 2000: 50). This position led to a clash between the USOC and the IOC that would not be settled until the early 1990s.
The basis for the USOC’s argument that it deserved a greater share of the revenue generated from U.S. television contracts stemmed from the 1978 Amateur Sports Act, under which Congress, in part, gave it exclusive use of all Olympic emblems within the United States. IOC lawyers knew the USOC had a legitimate argument but believed that it also was being selfish because it had refused to share the profits from the Los Angeles Games with any other NOC. Nevertheless, a deal was reached in which the USOC received a $15 million payment for the 1988 Olympic year and 10 percent of the U.S. television deals in the future (ibid).
These pages have shown that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States involved themselves in the discussions about television money unless self-interest was at stake. The research of this author and others suggests that the Soviets paid little attention to and publicly said almost nothing about the increasing television revenues and the dilemmas associated with them, except when those discussions involved the 1980 Moscow Games. Perhaps the Soviets stayed quiet because they believed that their agenda to make the IOC a more political body could not be realized regardless of what route it took with television money. Put another way, the issue of television rights was not part of the Soviets’ political program, which included, among other items, the admission of an East German Olympic team and the expulsions of South Africa and Taiwan. The argument is weakened because of the aforementioned suggestions by Andrianov that the IOC should use some of its new wealth to revamp its office and become a greater force for social peace. In other words, the Soviet delegation actually might have seen television money as a means of furthering their political ends. Perhaps they remained mum because they agreed with Brundage that television’s values were inconsistent with those of the Olympic movement. On the surface, this appears to be an area that the Soviets could have exploited; they could have argued they (and their satellite states) were creating an athletic system in line with Coubertin’s vision for what sports should do for a populace, and the Western powers were seeking to undermine that vision through the commercialization of athletics. However, the mutual distrust between the Soviets and Brundage might have made it impossible for the former to say or do anything that would have enhanced the stature of the latter. Perhaps they remained silent because any talk about commercialism was incompatible with socialism. In other words, there was no way that Soviet Olympic officials could speak about something that was politically unpopular within the USSR.
Several explanations might account for why U.S. officials had little involvement in the developing issue of television rights fees and the Olympic movement. Perhaps the Amateur Sports Act finally gave them what they previously had lacked: The legal basis for a claim to a greater share of U.S. television money. Perhaps they said little because until the late 1970s there was not much of a television pot. The combination of these two factors also cannot be overlooked: The USOC gained its legal footing at almost the exact time that television rights fees exploded; the combined power of both issues opened the door for the call to keep more U.S. money at home. Another potential cause for the silence cannot be dismissed: It was during the 1970s that the dominance of American athletes at the Olympic Games began to wane, and Soviet and East German athletes began to be recognized as the world’s best. Perhaps American officials saw television dollars as a means to devote more money to their domestic Olympic effort, which might lead to the development of more Olympic champions. 
Pablo Rodas, who presided over Paraguay’s National Olympic Committee in the 1990s, summed up the uneasy relationship between television networks and the IOC perhaps better than anyone else: “The marketing of television rights for the Games brought considerable financial benefits to Organizing Committees for Olympic Games, but it should not be forgotten that, however profitable, the granting of exclusive rights to a single television company left the Games vulnerable to the whims of the company concerned” (IOC, 1994, 360). Whannel (Whannel, 1992) added that as the influence of television upon the Olympic movement has increased, the ability of the IOC to define the nature of the Games has decreased.

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